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Chapter 12

SOVIET NATIONAL
SECURITY DECISIONMAKING
by Kurt Campbell and Jeffrey W. Legro

Winston Churchill's characterization of the Soviet Union as a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma
may overstate Western understanding of the USSR's
national security decision-making. The evidence in this
domain is sparse, and what we do have is incomplete.
Indeed, the Soviets have taken extraordinary steps to
maintain the black box that shields how and why their
decisions are made. With these caveats in mind, knowledge of Soviet decision-making can be summed up in a
few general statements. First, the Soviet leadership is an
integrated political-military body, where political authority is dominant, but where the professional military
retains an important influence. Second, the role of
institutions and individuals varies within and between
leaderships, according to the issue under consideration
(e.g., doctrine, procurement, etc.), and between times
of peace and war. The potential for evolution in the
roles of institutions is particularly apparent in the cur-
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rent period of "perestroika." Gorbachev has initiated
changes that appear to be aimed at transforming the
security decision-making apparatus. Finally, the historical record of decision-making in superpower crises indicates that the Soviet Union has been very cautious in
confrontations with the United States, a tendency that
need not prove true in future clashes.

The Actors
The General Secretary, the Politburo, the Defense
Council, and the General Staff represent the core of the
national security apparatus. The Communist Party
dominates life in the Soviet Union and the Politburo is
its executive council. The Politburo, now composed of
twelve full (voting) and eight candidate (non-voting)
members, is headed by the General Secretary (Mikhail
Gorbachev).
The Defense Council links politicians and the military
at the highest level and is thought to act as a powerful
subcommittee of the Politburo, dealing with national
security issues on a day-to-day basis. This shadowy body,
which has been reconfigured several times since World
War II, is chaired by the General Secretary and is
believed to include the minister of defense, the minister,
of foreign affairs, the KGB chief, and the chairman of
the Council of Ministers (the head of the official govern-·
ment administrative body), among others. Its rnembed
have greater access to intelligence and military infor:
mation than do other members of the Politburo and
thus this council importantly shapes most national se:
curity issues.
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The General Staff, the command organ of the military services, is organizationally under the direction of
the Ministry of Defense but has direct ties to the Defense Council. In contrast with the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
it is headed by one man (Army General Moiseyev) and
has more power over the five individual military services
(ground forces, air forces, strategic rocket forces, air
defense troops, and navy).

Leadership Change and Issue Areas

The role of these different actors in decision-making
varies with the power of the leader and with the type of
issue under consideration.
The power of the General Secretary vis-a-vis his colleagues has tended to fluctuate over time. Usually the
leader builds increasing authority as his tenure in office
lengthens (Khrushchev is an important exception here).
As his power grows, the General Secretary is increasingly able to act independently of his colleagues on the
Politburo, and his individual style and preferences will
have a greater influence on decisions.
The decision-making style and substance. of different
leaderships has also varied considerably. For example,
the military under Brezhnev had much greater autonomy and authority in its duties than was the case in the
Stalin and Khrushchev periods. With Marshal Grechko's
ascendance to full membership on the Politburo in
1973, the professional military had a direct say in the
highest decision-making body of the Soviet Union. Today the military is again being dominated by the aggressive political leadership of Gorbachev. In light of the
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decision to withdraw from Afghanistan, the conclusion
of the INF treaty, and the unceremonious firing of
high-ranking generals in the wake of the young German
Mathias Rust's feat of landing a small plane in Red
Square, and the unilateral reduction of the armed
forces, speculation about military unhappiness with the
Gorbachev leadership may be justified.
Decision-making power is not only a product of institutional affiliations, but of personalities as well. As the
case of Marshal Ogarkov illustrates, a forceful individual with clearly articulated views can have a significant:
impact on policy. Although Ogarkov was removed in
1988 from his position as Chief of the General Staff, hi11
stress on the need for technological improvements ifl
the Soviet conventional force posture has had a lastin~
influence.
Another key determinant of the decision-makini
process is the specific issue under consideration. The
four most important issue areas are doctrine, force
structure and procurement, arms control, and crisis
management.
1. Doctrine. Military doctrine in the Soviet Union has
two distinct levels: the "socio-political" and the "militarytechnical." The dominant socio-political level consideiS
the nature, objectives, and initiation of war and is di<:tated exclusively by the Party leadership. The subordinate military-technical level deals with assessing t)je
threat, force structure, strategy, and troop preparatiofl,
and has traditionally been considered the realm <)f
military professionals. There is an inherent tensic>n
between these two levels, as the socio-political level
stresses war prevention, while the military-technical le-~'el
emphasizes war preparation, particularly the principles
of surprise, initiative, and preemption.
The Soviet military wields significant influence ue-
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cause of its traditional monopoly on military expertise
and information. There has been no civilian structure,
such as the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, that
parallels the military command. No institution, except
in limited aspects the KGB, is able to challenge the
military's interpretation of strategic requirements and
planning needs or its estimates of the size and nature of
military threats. Thus, despite having no formal vote in
the major decision-making bodies, the military retains
an important de facto authority. Gorbachev may be
attempting to reduce this authority by, among other
things, shifting oversight authority for defense budget
matters to a standing Committee on Military Affairs,
established in the new Soviet Parliament, and encouraging more open debate on national security issues.
Over the past two decades, the military's monopoly in
the realm of strategic nuclear weapons has weakened
somewhat as scientists and civilian analysts have begun
to take part in policy matters, much the same way U.S.
civilians did in the 1950s. In matters of conventional
warfare, the monopoly remains largely intact. However,
in this area, too, there have been indications under the
Gorbachev leadership that the civilian role will be increased.
2. Force Structure and Procurement. The political leadership ·oversees all decisions and is probably directly
involved with questions pertaining to major systems,
especially weapons that require significant resources.
Most requests for new weapons originate with the individual military services and are assessed and rationalized by the General Staff. As weapons have become
technologically more sophisticated, the academy of sciences and top science advisors have assumed increasing
importance in weapons acquisition and R&D investment
decisions.
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3. Anns Control. Decision-making in arms control is
similar to deliberations on doctrine except that civilians
outside the top leadership have a more prominent role.
The chief Soviet negotiators have historically been senior foreign ministry officials. Despite the military's efforts to deny information to even these diplomats, their
role has grown as a function of their experience and the
necessarily political nature of the arms control process.
Under Gorbachev, the now ex-Chief of the General
Staff, Marshal Akhromeyev, has played a key part in
arms control negotiations at summit meetings. In this
role, it is unclear whether he is a personal emissary of
Gorbachev, the official representative of military interests whose say is crucial, or both. Other civilian participants in the arms control process include analysts in
academic research institutes that study the \\est, whose
knowledge has been applicable to the ongoing negotiations with the U.S. and its allies. Finally, scientists have
become influential because of the crucial link between
rapidly changing technology and national security affairs.
4. Crisis Management. Decision-making in a crisis will
depend on the severity of the situation and the time
frame available for choice. For example, in the case of a
surprise attack, the General Secretary would make the
launch decision on his own authority; the Soviets have
their own equimlent to the U.S. President's "nuclear
football," a briefcase with nuclear release codes which
accompanies their leader. And in the case of a plane
intruding into Soviet airspace, the top political leadership might not be contacted at all-as is purported to,
have been the case with KAL 007-and the plane could
be shot down according to standard operating procedures.
There is no question that political officials have the
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exclusive authority to release nuclear weapons for use.
Soviet leaders are extremely concerned about unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons, and
they have gone to extensive lengths to prevent it. In the
early days of the nuclear era, warheads were kept separate from delivery systems and were under the control
of the KGB. Today, missiles of the strategic rocket forces
are equipped with multiple key systems (which the U.S.
calls permissive action links, PALs), and it is likely that
Soviet submarines also have some sort of external control device. In the case of tactical nuclear weapons held
outside the Soviet Union, nuclear charges are still
housed separately in special ammunition storage areas.
It is probable that the KGB, with its own communications network, continues to play a role in the control of
nuclear weapons.
As in the day-to-day formulation of national security
policy, the locus of crisis decision-making is the Defense
Council. This body appears to be a peacetime analogue
of the State Defense Committee, a unified politicaleconomic-military leadership organ which assumed supreme command of the country in World War II (and
would do so again if war breaks out). Despite the explicit
dominance of civilian political officials in the Defense
Council, the military can have a significant implicit influence. The nature of a conflict situation demands expertise in military affairs and, in this realm, the professional soldiers by and large have exclusive authority.
Because the General Staff acts as a secretariat for the
Defense Council, it is also able to shape the agenda and
decisions. More directly, the military is tasked to make
a timely determination of an outbreak of hostilities and
a potential enemy missile strike. Such a judgment would,
of course, have an important impact in a crisis. This
impact is of particular concern given the military's em-
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phasis on offensive operations, especially the key role of
preemption should a large-scale nuclear exchange appear imminent. Although Gorbachev's "new thinking"
in national security affairs has denounced preemption
and promised to upgrade the importance of defense in
Soviet strategic thought, the results in this area remain
unclear.

History of Soviet Decisions on Nuclear Weapons
in Crises
The historical record-albeit a very limited and
opaque one-is somewhat at odds with an image of thtSoviet leadership as an integrated political-military com-·
mand where an offensive-minded military has consid··
erable influence. One might expect from such a leader··
ship a skillful manipulation of the armed forces fof
political purposes and a military able to tilt the waf
prevention/war preparation dilemma in favor of seizinp
the initiative. In practice, however, the Soviet leadershif
has been extremely cautious regarding the use of forcie
in the few superpower crises that have occurred (thie
Cuban missile crisis and the 1973 Middle East War are
the most notable). Readiness levels of the Strategic
Rocket Forces have never been raised as a means df
demonstrating resolve. Furthermore, from what little
we know, the military has not been particularly eager t0
advocate use of force in crises with the U.S.
This record should not suggest that we can expect tHe
USSR to roll over in future clashes. Most of our evidenc:e
on Soviet crisis behavior comes from a period when tl':e
U.S. enjoyed overwhelming nuclear superiority. This Is
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no longer the case. Such a change, however, does not
mean that future Soviet decisions in crises will err on
the side of war preparation and initiation. -The Soviets
are still constrained by a desire to avoid nuclear war and
a uniquely disadvantageous geo-political situation. In
any conflict, especially those involving nuclear weapons,
the USSR is surrounded by potential adversaries, not
the least of which is China. As Brezhnev has asserted,
"There are two camps of nuclear weapons: those in the
USSR and those aimed at the USSR." Soviet decisions in
crises will be driven by a number of factors, including
the composition of the particular leadership, the international and regional balance of forces, and the specific
interests at stake. As these factors vary, so too will policy
choices.

Conclusion

Soviet national security decisions are made by an elite
group of political and military Communist Party officials. The nature of the decision-making process can
vary with the power of the General Secretary, the particular issue confronted, and the relative state of peace
and war. Political authority is dominant, yet the military
retains an important influence through its near-exclusive expertise in matters of armed conflict. The Gorbachev leadership has indicated a desire to weaken this
monopoly by establishing alternative sources of military
planning and threat analysis, but the fate of such efforts
remains uncertain. Finally, the history of Soviet decisions in superpower crises indicates that the USSR's
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leaders are hesitant to risk the possibility of a major
conflict, especially a nuclear war, with the United States.
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